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Abstract   The American Fisheries Act establishes procedures under which a
group of vessels and a processing plant can form a coop, the main purpose of
which is to establish a rights-based regulation program that will protect the in-
terests of both parties. The core principles for coop formation are specified, and
operating procedures which must be followed in order to obtain maximum effi-
ciency gains are derived. How the efficiency gains are split among coop
members by the choice of the ex-vessel price is demonstrated. In certain circum-
stances, a vessel and its harvest rights may switch coops. The effects of these
shifts on efficiency are analyzed in a way that separates the effects of the vessel
shift and of the transfer of production, and that specifies the conditions under
which there will be net efficiency gains. Finally, it is demonstrated that the
quasi-rents of all members of both coops are affected by a vessel switch. This
provides a reference for understanding when a vessel will agree to a shift and
the incentives for others to take action to support or oppose the shift.
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JEL Classification Code  Q22.
Introduction
In 1998, the United States Congress passed the American Fisheries Act (AFA) pro-
viding for a rationalization and decapitalization program for the Bering Sea pollock
fishery, which had excess harvesting and processing capacity and was regulated a
total allowable catch (TAC) program, by allowing participants to form a very spe-
cialized type of cooperative.1 Larkin and Sylvia (1999) describe the potential ben-
efits of cooperative behavior in the Pacific whiting fishery, and success in that in-
stance was an important basis for considering the AFA. Criddle and Macinko (2000)
and Matulich, Sever, and Inaba (2001) provide a summary of the legislative history
of the Act and the details of its provisions. The former claim that coops may well
become the property right system of choice in the US because of the development of
individual transferable quotas (ITQs) by councils, when permitted, becomes over-
whelmed by equity concerns, rent seeking, and strong (but conflicting) views of af-
fected stakeholders. Coops, they assert, are easier to put into place because they are
the result of direct Congressional action. One wonders if making that prediction
widely known is a sure way to make it wrong. The messy adoption fights will sim-
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afa/afa_sf.htm. A detailed report on the implementation of the act entitled “Impacts of the American
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ply move from Council meetings to the Halls of Congress. Matulich, Sever, and
Inaba focus on the long-term distribution effects of coops and conclude that some
processors may lose because of potential realignment of coops, the process of which
will be discussed below.
According to the provisions of the AFA, there are different coop rules for situa-
tions where there is vertical integration between processing plants and vessels (the
offshore sector) and those where the plants and vessels are independent. The second
type merits attention because of the special rules that are necessary to keep them op-
erational. It addition, it will likely be the model if ‘coop’ programs are adopted in
fisheries with many participants on both sides of the market.
The term coop is somewhat misleading, however. These entities are quite differ-
ent in organization and purpose than traditional agricultural coops where farmers co-
operate in purchasing inputs, storing inventories, and marketing outputs. While the
Magnuson-Stevens Act precludes the introduction of ITQ programs, AFA coops are
primarily a way to introduce a rights-based fishery management program, and in
particular, do so in a way that protects the interests of both processors and harvest-
ers (see below).
The enabling legislation and operating procedures established by the North Pa-
cific Fisheries Management Council specify the rules by which a group of indepen-
dent vessels and a single plant can form an inshore AFA coop. While the rules are
complex with many intricate side conditions and subject to frequent change by the
council, for analytical purposes they can be summarized as follows:2
1. Harvest rights, which are granted to vessels, are conditional upon membership
in a coop.
2. Harvest rights are transferable only among member vessels of the coop, and at
least 90% of each vessel’s fish must be sold to the plant member of the coop.
3. The only inter-coop interaction that is allowed is that a vessel and its harvest
rights may switch from one coop to another. This is a special type of transfer-
ability because it involves a combined transfer of the productive capacity of
the vessel and a non-divisible block of quota.3
A plant and the boats that supply it are given the opportunity to form a coop
where harvest rights are given to the vessels in accordance with their landings under
the existing open-access TAC regime. If agreement is not reached, the potential par-
ticipants must continue to operate in the TAC fishery. These procedures are to insure
that all parties in both sectors share in the gain from rationalization. If harvest rights
were granted to vessels with no restrictions on where the fish may be processed, it is
likely that processors would be forced into a bidding war for product with the result
that the entire TAC would be processed by only a subset of existing plants that
would be paying high ex-vessel prices. All gains from rationalization would accrue
to the owners of the harvest rights. See Anderson (2000).
There are processes in the system designed to balance the interests of both
plants and vessels. First, the specifics of how the gains will be split must be deter-
mined before the annual harvest rights are granted. This involves determining how
2 For more information on coop operating rules use the search engine at www.fakr.noaa.gov/npfmc/
default.htm.
3 As this paper has gone through the review process, certain exceptions to this rule have been allowed.
For example, a boat from one coop can temporarily catch some of the allowable harvest of another coop
if both plants and both fleets agree. If more and more exceptions are made to this rule such that vessels
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the catch will be processed, by whom it will be harvested, and the ex-vessel price
that will be paid to harvesters. If the potential participants cannot agree, the coop
will not be formed, and they all will lose the potential benefits of removing them-
selves from the open-access fishery. The plant has the incentive to offer an ex-vessel
price high enough to encourage vessels to join, and the vessels will be protected
from lower prices which could potentially be offered if they were not set before
agreeing to sell exclusively to one plant. Eighty percent of the eligible vessels must
agree to the arrangement. If the AFA coop is formed, the boats that did not vote for
it may still join and participate according to the agreement. If a boat wishes to
switch coops, it must drop out of its current coop and fish in the open-access TAC
fishery for one year before joining the new coop.
The purpose here is to provide a micro-economic analysis of inshore AFA coops
as defined by the three characteristics, listed above, to provide a basis for consider-
ing if similar constructs should be adopted in other fisheries. First, the operational
rules that must be followed in order to maximize the gains offered by the harvest
rights will be described. The discussion will focus on how the gains are distributed
between coop members by the choice of the ex-vessel price, which is an important
element in coop formation. Second, the efficiency effects of vessel switches between
coops will be analyzed. Again, there will be a focus on distribution effects because
they will affect the ability of members of the potential new coop to reach the agree-
ment necessary for its formation. Combining the analysis of efficiency gains and
distribution effects allows for a comparison of the compatibility of public and pri-
vate interests with respect to vessel switches.
The following notation will be used in the analysis to follow.
T = The number of days the fishery operates in a given year. Tmax is the maxi-
mum possible given fish availability and weather conditions. Actual days
operated depend on the management regime and will be noted with appro-
priate subscripts.
TVC(y) = Total daily variable cost function of a boat or a plant. When referring to a
boat, yh will be used and it represents daily harvest of raw fish. When re-
ferring to a plant, yp will be used and it represents the daily amount of
raw fish processed. Assume the function generates the normal, u-shaped
average variable cost curve, and let MC(y) and AVC(y) represent marginal
and average variable cost. Assume that stock size is fixed by a TAC
policy, and so its effect on cost can be ignored.4
yh,minavc = Daily harvest level at the minimum of the daily AVC curve.
Pex = Ex-vessel price of fish.
α (yp) = Product recovery rate, the percentage yield of final product from raw fish.
It is assumed to be a decreasing function of the daily output rate.
Pp(yp) = Price of final product. Assume that price is a function of product form
and/or quality that is also a decreasing function of the daily output rate.
R(yp) = Return per unit of processed fish = α (yp)Pp(yp). This is used to capture the
effects the race for fish in a TAC fishery can have on the value of final
product.
4 This cost function is designed to capture the effects of season length on efficiency. If daily marginal
cost is constant, cost savings from increasing season length will come from spreading fixed costs over a
larger output. If the vessel cost structure is in terms of trips rather than fishing days, the result derived
below still applies. Gains will come from being better able to derive a seasonal plan of trips due to in-
creased season length. See Anderson (1999).Anderson 210
The Operation of a Coop Program
Consider one coop in an inshore AFA coop regime that is implemented on top of a
TAC program, and denote the heterogeneous vessels which supply the plant as
vesseli, i = 1 to n. Assume each vessel is granted a vessel quota share, VQSi, equal to
its output under the TAC regime. The allowable harvest for the coop, CQS, will be
Σ VQSi, if vessels sell all output to the plant (see below). In order for the potential
members to have enough information to determine if they should join the coop,
there are two issues that must be settled. First, the production program of the plant
and the vessels must be determined. Second, the plant and the vessels must agree on
an ex-vessel price. Given the first, the selection of the ex-vessel price will determine
PVQS, the market clearing rental price for trades in VQS.
The elimination of the race of fish provides for efficiency gains from cost re-
duction and product improvement. The coop production program must be organized
to capture these potential benefits. Since harvest is fixed, the coop can maximize re-
turns by maximizing the value of the output and minimizing the sum of harvesting
and processing costs. This involves determining the plant daily output and operating
period and which vessels should operate and at what level. The latter implicitly in-
volves a market clearing price for trades of VQS. For discussion purposes, the pro-
cess can be divided into separate problems dealing with processing and harvesting.
First, the plant must select the daily output level and plant operation period such
that the value of processed fish is maximized subject to Typ ≤  CQS, and T ≤  Tmax.
The Lagranian and the first-order conditions are:
   L =∗ −∗ + − + − T R y y T TVC y Ty T T pp p p () () ( ) ( ) max λλ 12 CQS (1)
∂∂ = + − − = L y R y R MC y pp p ’( ) λ 1 0
   ∂∂= − − − = L T R y y TVC y y pp p p () () . λλ 12 0 (2)
If the season constraint is not binding, as will be the case in a TAC fishery with
over-capacity, λ 2 will equal zero, and from equation (2) λ 1 equals R(yp) – AVC(yp),
the average value of processed fish. Therefore, from equation (1), the required daily
plant output is where R’yp + R(yp) – MC(yp) = R(yp) – AVC(yp), or where the marginal
equals the average value of processed fish. This is where the value per unit of processed
fish is maximized. If the return per unit of output is not dependent upon the rate of out-
put, R’ equals zero, and the optimal rate will be where MC equals AVC, the minimum
of the plant’s daily AVC curve. Call the optimal daily rate of plant output yp,coop.
It follows that the required production period, call it Tcoop, must equal CQS/yp,coop.
Note that the optimal plant output rate is not a function of CQS. As long as the sea-
sonal constraint is not binding, changes in CQS will only affect the season length,
not daily output.
If the season constraint is binding, the solution is different. The plant must oper-
ate at a higher daily rate in order to process all the allowable fish. It does not make
sense to use the scarce season time to squeeze the last amount of profit from every
unit of fish if it means that some of the available units will not be processed at all.
Given the optimal daily plant output rate, the next step is to minimize the har-
vesting cost of supplying yp,coop units of raw fish per day. Formally, the problem is to
find the optimal daily output for each of the participating vessels so as to minimize
the sum of variable harvesting costs subject to Σ yhi = yp,coop and that yhi be greater or
equal to yhi,minavc for all operating vessels. The Lagranian and the first-order condi-
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If the minimum output constraint is binding for any vessel, its production should be
zero, which is to say that that vessel should be retired. Otherwise the γ i term is zero,
and all operating boats must produce where their marginal costs are the same and
the sum of their production is yp,coop. Let yhi,coop represent the optimal daily level of
output for vesseli, remembering that it can be zero.5 If the required seasonal output
of a vessel is greater than its VQS, it will have to acquire VQS from other vessels,
and vice versa.
Call the above production plan, the optimal coop rules. In order to predict coop
behavior, it will be assumed that they follow these rules. A critical part of this as-
sumption is that vessels will trade VQS if it is to their advantage. While there is rea-
son to believe this, they may prefer to produce their own VQS out of loyalty to their
crews or because of other non-financial concerns.
This can be summarized in a graphical analysis that also demonstrates that the
gains from coop operation will be greater than the equivalent production under a
TAC. It can also shed light on the distribution of the gains to the coop members. A
plant’s derived inverse daily demand for raw fish follows from the first three terms
in equation (1). As long as total revenue is at least equal to the sum of raw fish cost
and variable processing costs, the plant can afford to pay the difference between
marginal return per unit of fish and the marginal processing cost.
PR y R M C y R y y P y T V C y ex p p p p ex p p =+ − −− ≥ ’( ) ( ) ( ) . if 0 (3)
It follows that the maximum bid price will be:
Max = ( ) – ( ). P R y AVC y ex p p (4)
From equations (3) and (4) it can be seen that the output with the highest bid price is
yp,coop. The plant’s seasonal demand curve is the horizontal sum of the daily demand
curves over the operation period. Two such demand curves are pictured in figure 1.
The curves are a horizontal line at Max Pex out to T*yp,coop for the given season
length. At higher outputs, the curve slopes downward because of diminishing mar-
ginal profitability per unit of fish.
Similarly, the vessel daily inverse supply curve of raw fish is the portion of its
MC curve above its AVC curve. Its seasonal supply curve will be the horizontal sum
of the daily curves for the operating period. Finally, the aggregate seasonal supply
curve will be the horizontal sum of the seasonal curves for all vessels. Two such ag-
gregate supply curves are also pictured in figure 1. The horizontal segment repre-
sents the minimum of the AVC of the most efficient vessel.
Assume that boat output is small relative to plant output and that under the TAC
regime all participating boats sold their entire output to the plant. Assume also that
the plant did not receive raw fish from other sources. Also assuming pure competi-
tion, TAC operation can be represented by the plant demand curve D(Ttac) and the
aggregate supply curve Σ S(Ttac). Formally, the equilibrium ex-vessel price, Pex(tac),
would be determined by the industry daily demand and supply curves (not pictured).
5 While it is not explicit in the analysis, input ratios can change as the firm moves along its marginal
cost curve. This means rationalization may have employment effects.Anderson 212
That price would determine industry daily output, which given the TAC, deter-
mines the season length, Ttac. The demand and supply curves are those for the
coop only, but given the assumptions, they must intersect at the industry deter-
mined ex-vessel price.
Total plant output is equal to CQS, and it will operate where the marginal
value of processed fish equals Pex(tac). The plant output will be harvested by the
vessels according to where their marginal cost curves equal Pex(tac). The plant’s
quasi-rents are represented by area A, while the sum of the quasi-rents to boats
is equal to areas B + C.6
Assuming all output stays with the coop, the optimal coop rules will require
that the plant increase operation days until the downward sloping part of the
seasonal demand curve begins at QVS represented by D(Tcoop). This will allow it
to produce its QVS at the daily output rate of yp,coop, which will lower process-
ing costs and increase the return per unit of processed fish. This increase in
value is represented by area F. If the season constraint precludes such an in-
crease, the plant should increase its season as much as possible. There will be
positive, although smaller, increases in quasi-rents. However, if the plant is al-
ready operating at Tmax under TACs, there are no possible gains from coop for-
mation because it can’t decrease the daily output rate.
Figure 1.  Analysis of Increase in Net Value of Production Due to Coop Formation
6 Given the small number of participants in many industrialized fisheries, the assumption of pure compe-
tition may not be valid. It is likely that ex-vessel price and output combinations in the inshore pollock
sector are determined by bilateral bargaining. This can be represented in figure 1. The TAC demand and
supply curves would still apply. Assume for clarity that CQS is the agreed-upon output. If the agreed-
upon price is greater than Pex(tac), the plant will be losing money on marginal units, but could still be
earning positive quasi-rents if the earnings on the first units are greater than the losses on the marginal
units. A similar situation would hold for vessels if the chosen ex-vessel price was less than Pex(tac). The
analysis of gains from coop operation which follows applies to the bilateral bargaining case, but the de-
tails are not described.AFA Coops 213
The optimal coop rules require that vessels operate the same number of
days as the plant, which will shift the supply curve to Σ S(Tcoop). Assuming that
yh,minavc of the most efficient vessel is less than yp,coop, this curve will intersect
the CQS line in its upward sloping portion. This intersection determines MC*,
the marginal cost at which each operating vessel must produce in order to minimize
total harvesting costs. The lower daily harvesting rates will lower the total harvest-
ing costs and generate a gain in the value of total output equal to areas D + E.
The analysis thus far has described the optimal coop rules and explained
how they can generate an increase in output value. Consider now the determina-
tion of an acceptable coop ex-vessel price, Pex(coop). The discussion will show
that if the members set Pex(coop) equal to Pex(tac), all potential members will in-
crease quasi-rents relative to TAC operation.7 In addition, the range of accept-
able ex-vessel prices will be described.
It follows from figure 1 that if Pex(coop) = Pex(tac), the plant will increase
quasi-rents by an amount equal to area F, which is the sum of the increase in the
value of final market output and the savings from the decrease in processing
costs. Increases in ex-vessel price will reduce the size of the rectangle repre-
senting plant quasi-rent. If the coop agrees to a higher ex-vessel price, some of
the gains from processing will go to the vessels. The maximum Pex(coop) the plant
would agree to is the one where the revenue rectangle is equal to area A.
If only 90% of CQS is delivered to the plant, as is possible under the coop
formation rules, the operation point will shift to the left. This means that the
triangle representing the gains will be smaller, and in addition, the plant will
lose some of the status quo quasi-rents represented by area A. It would not be
better off with a Pex(coop) = Pex(tac) unless the gain from the increased efficiency of
the smaller output is greater than the loss from the reduction in output. The
plant may require a lower ex-vessel price to maintain their status quo rents.
In more formal terms, the plant can be better off even with a higher ex-ves-
sel price as long the price increase is less than the increase in average return
per unit of raw fish processed. Letting Π  represent quasi-rents, the highest price
that can be agreed to is:
Max P P CQS ex coop ex tac tac coop () ( ) . =+ − [] ΠΠ (5)
Now consider the return to vessels if Pex(coop) = Pex(tac). From figure 1, the sum of
the increases in quasi-rent to the vessels equals areas D + E, which is the sav-
ings in harvesting costs. In order to see how these gains are spread among par-
ticipating vessels, it is necessary to look at vessel operation and the market for
VQS. The optimal coop rules require that each vessel operate where their daily
marginal cost equals MC*. If this output level does not match their VQS, they
will have to buy or sell quota rights. The market clearing rental price of VQS,
PVQS, will be the difference between Pex(coop) and MC*. That is, if potential mem-
bers follow the optimal coop rules, the choice of a Pex(coop) implicitly determines
PVQS because PVQS = Pex(coop) – MC*.
To demonstrate that all vessels will increase quasi-rents if Pex(coop) = Pex(tac),
let S(Ttac) and S(Tcoop) in figure 2 represent annual supply curves for a represen-
tative vessel for the relevant season lengths. Under the TAC program, the vessel
will produce at VQS1, and net returns will equal areas A + C + G. Where the
7 A better criterion for joining a coop is whether a firm is better off in or out of the coop given the ex-
pectation that other coops will be formed, but it is not possible to apply it here.Anderson 214
vessel will operate with a coop depends upon its efficiency relative to the rest
of the fleet. A boat is relatively efficient if the PVQS is such that its output in-
creases under coop operation. This case can be represented by a rental price of
VQS equal to PVQS1. The vessel will operate at y1 and will lease in VQS equal to
y1 – VQS1. The rent to its VQS will equal areas A + B, and the return to vessel opera-
tion will equal areas C + G + H + D + F. This is a net gain of areas H + D + F + B.8
The case where a boat is inefficient relative to the rest of the fleet can be repre-
sented using a rental price of PVQS2. The vessel will produce y2 units and will lease
out VQS1 – y2 units of VQS. The VQS rent will equal areas A + B + C + D + E, while
vessel profits will equal areas G + H. The net gain will be H + D + E + B. So, if a
vessel’s VQS is equal to its TAC output, its total quasi-rents will increase whether its
leases VQS in or out.
Vessels can also make gains even with a reduction in the ex-vessel price. If a
lower one is selected, some of the gains in the harvesting sector will go to the plant.
The total returns to a vessel is the sum of vessel profits and VQS rents. These can be
expressed as:
π i coop hi coop i hi coop coop T MC y TVC y () () ( ) *
,, =− [] (6)
VQS rent P MC VQS ji ex coop i =− [] ()
* . (7)
In equation (6), the return per unit of output is actually Pex(coop) – PVQS, but since
PVQS = Pex(coop) – MC*, it can be expressed as MC*. For a vessel to obtain the same
total earnings, the following must hold:
Figure 2.  Analysis of Gains to Vessels From Joining Coops
8 A reviewer noted that while the entire operation will gain, the net effect on returns to the boat is areas
F + D + H – A, which can be negative. This means that returns to crew members could fall.AFA Coops 215
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To avoid losses, Pex(coop) must be greater than MC* by an amount equal to the loss in
vessel profit per unit of output. The lowest possible Pex(coop) will be determined by
the boat which suffers the largest decrease:










A final point concerning the selection of Pex(coop) has to do with status quo prof-
itability. Some participants may not have been covering fixed, or even variable,
costs during the last period under the TAC.9 The viability of a coop may neces-
sitate that Pex(coop) move towards the extremes of the possible range depending
upon whether it is a boat or the plant which is not covering all costs. Vessels
will want to keep the plant operating, which means they may agree to a Pex(coop)
that is less than Pex(tac). However, there is a limit, and it is possible that there
may be no ex-vessel price which provides long-run profits to both sides. Like-
wise, a plant may agree to a Pex(coop) which is greater than Pex(tac) to keep the
coop viable. Alternatively, it may provide independent aid to certain vessels to
avoid paying higher prices to all vessels.
The analysis so far has shown that the formation of a coop can lead to effi-
ciency gains, and there is a range of ex-vessel prices where all coop members
can increase returns relative to TAC operation. However, even if coops take ad-
vantage of this potential cost saving, they will not capture all of the potential
gains of an ITQ program. First, while the marginal harvesting cost will be the
same for all vessels in a coop, it is unlikely that it will be the same for vessels
in different coops. A corollary is that due to differences in relative efficiencies,
a vessel that ceases production in one coop could be more efficient than an op-
erating vessel in another. Second, there is an asymmetry in the possibility of re-
moval of excess harvesting and processing capacity. Due to VQS trades among
vessels in a coop, less efficient vessels may cease production. However, by the
nature of the coop system, the number of processing plants will, at least ini-
tially, stay the same. There is an irony here. Coops cannot produce gains unless
the season constraint is non-binding, which normally means overcapacity in
processing. However, in the initial stages, coop formation does not provide for
the exit of processing capacity.
9 One might question whether any firms would fall into this category because if they are not covering
variable costs, economic logic says they would not operate. However, this is ex-post logic. There are
many reasons why a real-world firm would find itself in this situation for a given year, including con-
tractual agreements and the hope that things will improve in the future. It must also be remembered that
this theoretical formulation assumes that all prices remain the same for the entire season, and this may
not be the case in the real world. If things take a turn for the worse at the end of the season, a firm may
end up in a net loss situation.Anderson 216
Analysis of Vessel Switches
The remainder of the paper will consider the third characteristic of inshore AFA
coops, which is the possibility of vessel switches. There are several items of inter-
est. First, how will switches affect overall efficiency? It will be shown that
some switches can reduce efficiency. Second, how will the switches affect the
quasi-rents of the participants and hence their willingness to vote for a particu-
lar switch? It will be shown that switches will affect all members of both coops.
Finally, will the private incentives for switches necessarily result in efficiency-
improving switches? It will be shown that switches that increase efficiency may
be rejected, and those that decrease efficiency may be accepted.
In order to investigate the efficiency and distribution effects of vessel
switches, it is necessary to see how MC* will change with the number and effi-
ciency of vessels in the coop and what effects this will have on the average cost
of harvest. When a vessel and its VQS are added to a coop when the seasonal
constraint is non-binding, daily plant output stays the same, but season length
increases. The effects on harvesting can be analyzed using figure 3. Given a
daily plant output of yp,coop and a coop fleet size which generates the daily sup-
ply curve S1, a vessel switch will shift the supply curve to the right, and MC*
will fall from MC1
* to  MC2
*. Total harvest cost will fall by an amount equal to
areas A + B, and average cost will fall by that amount divided by yp,coop. If in-
stead output was y’p,coop, total costs would fall by areas A + B + C + D. Given
that the horizontal distance between the two supply curves increases at higher
prices (as it will if the supply curve of the new vessel is upward sloping), then
the increase in cost savings (area C + D) is greater than proportional to the dif-
ference in output. Therefore, the savings in harvesting cost from a change in
fleet size will be larger with higher plant output levels.
Further, all else equal, the horizontal shift of the supply curve will be in-
versely proportional to the number of existing vessels, and the more efficient
the additional vessel, the larger will be the horizontal shift. Therefore, the
larger the fleet size and the less efficient the entering vessel, the lower the cost
savings provided by an extra vessel will be.
Efficiency Gains from Vessel Switches
As a starting point, consider the trade of harvest rights in an ITQ system. First,
as long as vessels sell in the same market, there will be incentives to trade if
there is a difference in marginal harvesting cost. The vessel with the lower mar-
ginal cost can purchase rights at a price where both buyer and seller will be bet-
ter off. Further, there will be general efficiency gains because of the reduction
in harvesting cost. However, other harvesters will not be affected by the trade,
and because of the divisibility of harvest rights, trades can continue until mar-
ginal harvest costs are equal. On the other margin, vessels will tend to sell to
the processors that can pay the highest ex-vessel prices. Competition will force
all plants to pay the same price, so the marginal value of processed fish will be
the same in all plants.
While a shift of a vessel and its VQS may appear analogous to trades of har-
vest rights in an ITQ system, they are quite different. There is limited divisibil-
ity of the harvest rights, and the productive capacity of the vessel is also in-
volved in the trade. Finally, with coops, marginal value of processed fish may
not be equal in all plants, as it will be in a functioning ITQ system. Therefore,
vessel switches may involve processing efficiency effects. Given the optimalAFA Coops 217
coop rules, each of these will influence the efficiency effects of a vessel switch.
To demonstrate, consider the switch of a vessel and its VQS from coop L to
coop G. Designate CQSL and CQSG as the status quo quota share in the two
coops and VQSS as the quota share of the switching vessel. Let:
∆ R = The change in average harvest cost in coop L as a result of the vessel loss.
∆ P = The change in average harvest cost in coop G as a result of the vessel gain.
∆ S = The change in the average harvest cost of the switched production; this is
the AC in coop G after the switch minus the AC in coop L before the
switch.
∆ ps = The change in the average market value of the switched production. This
is the average in coop G after the switch minus the average in coop L be-
fore the switch.
The change in value of output as a result of the vessel and VQS switch can be ex-
pressed as:
∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ Value VQS CQS VQS CQS VQS ps s R L s P G S s =− − [] −− . (8)
The first term is the change in the value of processed fish from the VQS that is
switched. The second is the change in the cost of harvesting the remaining pro-
duction in coop L, the third is the change in the cost of harvesting the previous
production in coop G, and the fourth is the change in the cost of harvesting the
output that is switched. The change in average harvesting cost is explained in
figure 3.
The change in value will depend upon the efficiency of the moving boat
relative to those in its old coop (which determines ∆ R) and relative to those in
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its new coop (which determines ∆ P), the ex ante harvesting and processing effi-
ciency of coop L relative to the ex post efficiencies of coop G (which deter-
mines ∆ S and ∆ PS), the status quo CQS in both coops, and the VQS of the switch-
ing vessel.
Rearranging equation (8) obtains:
∆∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ Value CQS CQS VQS RL PG s P S S R =− + [] +− + [] . (8a)
The first term is the change in harvest costs that result solely from the change in har-
vesting efficiency in the two coops because of the vessel switch. The second is the
change in value that results from the transfer of the VQS that accompanies the vessel.
This is a linear equation where the vertical intercept is –[∆ RCQSL + ∆ PCQSG],
the horizontal intercept is [∆ RCQSL + ∆ PCQSG]/[ ∆ PS – ∆ S + ∆ R], and the slope is
[∆ PS – ∆ S + ∆ R]. The potential for increases in value given the possible combinations
of signs for the vertical intercept and the slope is summarized in figure 4. In Cases 1
and 3, the vessel shift by itself will generate gains. Further, the shift of VQS adds to
the gain in Case 1 but reduces it in Case 3. However, the aggregate gain can still be
positive if VQSS is less than the horizontal intercept. On the other hand, in Cases 2
and 4 the vessel shift reduces output value. In Case 2, the shift of VQS can counter-
act these loses, and there will be a net increase in value if VQSS is greater than the
horizontal intercept. In case 4, the VQS shift exacerbates the loss in value.
Beyond presenting equation (8a), and noting that the economic efficiency ef-
fects of vessel switching in AFA coops are much different than simple trades in
ITQs, it is difficult to draw specific conclusions about what will happen in any par-
ticular case. However, a few general conclusions are possible. First, since ∆ R will be
positive and ∆ P will be negative if the season constraint is not binding, then all else
equal, the chances that a vessel switch will result in an overall increase in value will
Figure 4.  Summary of the Potential Changes in Output Value Depending Upon the
Interactive Effects of the Switch of the Vessel Itself and the Transfer of Production
– [∆ RCQSL + ∆ PCQSG] > 0 – [∆ RCQSL + ∆ PCQSG] < 0
Switch of vessel with no Switch of vessel with
change in VQS will no change in VQS will
increase efficiency. decrease efficiency.
[∆ PS – ∆ S + ∆ R] > 0 Case 1 Case 2
Transfer of VQS Negative horizontal intercept. Positive horizontal intercept.
increases efficiency. Always results in a value Value increase will result
increase. if VQSs is greater than the
horizontal intercept.
[∆ PS – ∆ S + ∆ R] < 0 Case 3 Case 4
Transfer of VQS Positive horizontal intercept. Negative horizontal intercept.
increases efficiency. Value increase will result Never results in a value increase.
if VQSS is less than the
horizontal intercept.AFA Coops 219
improve if the CQS in the coop that gains a vessel is high relative to that of the coop
that loses a vessel because then –[∆ RCQSL + ∆ PCQSG] can be positive.
Second, while ∆ R, ∆ P, ∆ S and ∆ PS, are the result of the relative efficiencies of the
boats and the plants and hence endogenous, CQSY, CQSX, and VQSS are exogenous.
The initial allocation system for distributing VQS among coops and between boats in
a coop will have impacts on the possibility of gains from vessel switches. As will be
shown below, it will also have impacts on the distribution effects of vessel switches
as well.
Effects of Coop Reorganization on Individual Vessels
At first glance, it may appear that differences in Pex(coop) will be the critical determi-
nant to induce a vessel to switch coops and that a switch will only affect the two
plants and the switching vessel. However, this is not the case. The returns to coop
members are a function of Tcoop and PVQS, as well as Pex(coop) [see equations (6) and
(7)]. Therefore, a vessel switch will change the quasi-rents of all members of both
coops even when Pex(coop) remains the same in both. If coops continue to follow the
optimal coop rules, both Tcoop and PVQS will change with a change in number of ves-
sels. The effect on returns to vessels is not straightforward because while they will
vary directly with Tcoop, a change in PVQS will have countervailing effects. A positive
change will increase rent to VQS, but will reduce boat profits.
The effects on each type of affected party will be considered below. In all cases,
it will be assumed that the season constraint is not binding both before and after the
vessel switch. This is the case that will likely apply during the first stages of vessel
switching.
Consider first the effects of a vessel switch on the current members of the coop
that gains a vessel. To separate out the effects of the vessel switch, assume for the
moment that Pex(coop) does not change. Tcoop must increase in order to process the extra
VQS. PVQS will increase, because as explained above, the entry of a vessel into a
coop will decrease MC*. The effects can be demonstrated using figure 5, which plots
the seasonal marginal cost curves of a vessel for two different season lengths. The
case where Pex(coop) does not change, but T and PVQS both increase, is represented by a
change in annual output from y1, with a price of VQS equal to PVQS1, and a season
length of T1, to an annual output y2, a price of VQS equal to PVQS2, and a season
length of T2. The vessel profit at either output level is represented by the area above
the relevant marginal cost curve and below the relevant net price line over the range
of output. Rent to VQS is represented by the area between Pex(coop) and the relevant
Pex(coop) – PVQS over the range of VQS held by the vessel. Two levels are shown; VQSa
represents a vessel which leases in, and VQSb represents a vessel which leases out.10
To minimize graphical complexity, the areas representing total profits and total
rents are not labeled. However, the changes in returns can be easily shown. The in-
dependent changes in vessel profits due to the changes in both parameters are shown
in the first two rows of figure 6. The changes in VQS rent for the two levels of VQS
holdings are shown in the next two rows. The net effects are shown in the final two
rows. For the vessel which leases out, the gain in VQS rent will always be greater
than the decrease in vessel profit due to the change in Pex(coop) – PVQS, and given the
additional increase in returns due to the increased season, the vessel will show an
10 With different placements of the new seasonal supply curve, the new net price line, and the VQSb line,
it is possible that Y2 could be less than Y1 or that Y2 could be greater than VQSb. While this will change
the geometrical depiction of gains and loses, the results will not change.Anderson 220
Figure 5.   Analysis of Changes in Vessel Returns When a New Member Joins a Coop
Decrease in vessel profit due to decrease in Pex – PVQS given –A – B
that season length remains at T1.
Gain in vessel profit due to increase in T given the new, F + G
lower Pex – PVQS.
Gain in VQS rent to vessel which leases out and whose VQS + A + B + C + D + E
holdings are represented by VQSb.
Gain in VQS rent to vessel which leases in and whose VQS + A
holdings are represented by VQSa.
Net gain for vessel which leases out. F + G + C + D + E
Net gain for vessel which leases in. F + G – B
Figure 6.  Summary of Changes When T and PVQS Increase
(see figure 5)
increase in net returns. However, if a vessel leases in, the loss in vessel profits due
to the increase in PVQS will always be more than the increase in VQS rents. There-
fore, they will gain or lose depending upon whether the gain in profits from the in-
creased T is greater than the net loss from the change in PVQS. That is, if Area F + G
is greater than Area B. The loss of Area B represents the negative effect of the in-
crease in PVQS on previous production. All else equal, the more the vessel leases in,
the larger Area B will be and the greater the chance that the net effect will be a loss.AFA Coops 221
If Pex(coop) is increased as part of the switch, existing vessels which lease out will
gain even more, and the chance that those which lease in will have positive gains
will increase.
Consider now the remaining vessels in a coop which lose a vessel where
Tcoop and PVQS will both decrease. The results are just the reverse of the previous
analysis; all gains become losses and all losses become gains. Therefore, ves-
sels that lease out VQS will always lose, and those that lease in will gain or lose
depending on sign of B – F – G. Here, Area B is the cost savings for the reduc-
tion in the price paid for VQS rental. Therefore, all else equal, the more the ves-
sel leases in, the greater will be the chance that the net gain will be positive.
The switching vessel will also face changes in the parameters that determine net
returns. They will change from those that exist in its old coop before the switch to
that which exist in the new coop after its entry. More to the point, a vessel will have
no incentive to switch unless the new combination of parameters will produce
higher net returns. Figure 7 describes the possible effects of changes in PVQS and
Tcoop with a constant Pex(coop). Cases 1 and 4 were derived above, and Cases 2 and 3
follow from a similar analysis. It follows that if the ex-vessel prices in different
coops are similar, a vessel will be more likely to move to a coop with a longer sea-
son. Further, if it leases VQS in, which means that it is a relatively efficient vessel in
the original coop, there will be incentives to move to coops with a lower PVQS. On
the other hand, if it leases VQS out, it will tend to move to a coop with a higher
PVQS. Obviously, a vessel will enjoy increased returns no matter what the change in
PVQS and Tcoop if the plant offers a sufficiently high Pex(coop).
The effect of vessel switches on plants is straightforward. If a coop loses a
vessel, the plant suffers a loss in quasi-rents due to the reduction in VQS. It
may suffer further losses if a higher Pex(coop) becomes necessary to keep the new,
smaller coop functioning. If a coop gains a vessel, the plant will enjoy an in-
crease in quasi-rents from the increase in VQS. If an increase in Pex(coop) is nec-
T Increase T Decrease
PVQS ↑ Case 1 Case 2
Vessels which lease out will gain. Vessels which lease out may
Vessels which lease in may gain gain or lose; the more leased
or lose; the more leased in, out, the greater the chance of gain.
the greater the chance of loss.
Vessels which lease in will lose.
PVQS ↓ Case 3 Case 4
Vessels which lease out may Vessels which lease out will lose.
gain or lose; the more leased out,
the greater the chance of loss. Vessels which lease in may gain
or lose; the more leased in,
Vessels which lease in will gain. the greater the chance of gain.
Figure 7. Effects on Net Quasi-rents of Vessels With Different Changes in PVQS and Tcoop.Anderson 222
essary to attract the new vessel, the gains will be smaller. The point is that
plants will not agree to the entry of a vessel if it will reduce its quasi-rents. All
else equal, it would appear that they would seek out vessels which could be at-
tracted without an increase in Pex(coop).
Compatibility of Public and Private Interests in Vessel Switching
The gains from the efficiencies that result from ITQ trades provide the basis for
the increase in returns to the two trading partners. Similarly, any efficiency
gains that result from vessel switches can provide the basis for increased re-
turns for members of the reformulated coops. However, because of the differen-
tial effects a vessel shift can have on different parties, some participants will
gain even when there are net efficiency losses, and some will lose when there
are net efficiency gains. This raises the possibility that potential switches that
do not provide efficiency gains may occur and that those which do provide
gains may be prevented.
The net efficiency and distribution effects of a vessel switch can be repre-
sented as:
+–
Σ Value = Σ∆ quasi-rents Coop G + Σ∆ quasi-rents Coop L.
The left-hand side is the value determined by equation (8). The right-hand side
specifies that the sum of the gains and losses in quasi-rents must equal the
change in value. The sum of the changes in quasi-rents to the members of coop
G will always be positive because of the increase in fish to harvest. However,
the exact distribution will depend upon the new Pex(coop) and whether a vessel
leases VQS in or out, and some members may be worse off. On the other hand,
the sum of the changes in quasi-rents to the members of coop L will always be
negative, although some members may enjoy gains.
This is a likely explanation for the original restriction where a vessel has to
fish in the TAC fishery for one year before joining a new coop. In the negotia-
tions that led to the act, vessel owners wanted the right to switch, while plant own-
ers, fearing a loss in quasi-rents, did not. The one-year provision was the compro-
mise. If AFA coops are instituted in other fisheries, rules to restrict switches
that could potentially increase efficiency will likely be part of the debate.
To return to the main argument, consider a case where Σ Value is negative
but all members of coop G, including the new boat, enjoy gains. This would be
possible if Pex(coop) was similar in all coops and the volume of trades in VQS was
relatively small. Given that the parties responsible for initiating this action
would be better off, it is possible that such a switch would take place. Alterna-
tively, consider a case where Σ Value is positive but the switching vessel would
suffer losses with an increase in Pex(coop), which the plant cannot agree to without
suffering decreases in quasi-rents. Given that the two critical parties could not both
gain, it is possible that this potentially beneficial switch may not occur.
However, the issue is more complicated. In the first example, if the mem-
bers of coop L discover that a vessel is considering a move, it will be to their
advantage to entice it to stay. If they can offer a side-payment larger than the
gain from transferring, the vessel may not switch. Then, the members of coop G
may consider other side payments to further entice the vessel to switch. Since
Coop L has more to lose than Coop G has to gain, (otherwise Σ Value would notAFA Coops 223
be negative), with zero transactions costs, they should be able to convince the
vessel to stay. However, this sword cuts two ways. While zero transaction costs
mean that coop members could arrange side payments to prevent an inefficient
reallocation from taking place, what is to prevent vessels from trying to demon-
strate a credible threat to leave in order to receive side payments?
Summary
An inshore AFA coop may provide efficiency gains if the plant and boats are
not bound by the season constraint under the TAC regime. Both the plant and
the boats will show individual gains if their VQS is equal to TAC catch and the
TAC ex-vessel price is used. In the short run, coops will not achieve the same
level of efficiency gains as ITQs because vessel rationalization is among a sub-
group of the fleet and there is no rationalization of plants. While vessel
switches may allow for improved efficiency over initial coop formation, they
are not analogous to simple trades in ITQ programs. Both the switch of the ves-
sel and the transfer of the VQS will have separate efficiency effects that can
work in the same or opposite directions. See equation (8) and figure 4.
All vessels in both coops will undergo changes in quasi-rents as a result of
a vessel switch, and whether the change will be positive or negative depends
upon whether they lease VQS in or out. Because of the differences between the
gains and losses of different participants, it is possible that private incentives
may be incompatible with moves that will increase efficiency.
In summary, inshore AFA coops are a way of introducing rights-based fish-
ery management, and they can produce efficiency gains. As with any rights-
based regime, including the different types of ITQ programs, the potential gains
will depend upon how the rights are specified (see Scott 2000). While AFA
coops have attributes that may preclude some efficiency benefits, they may be a
useful addition to the manager’s toolbox. For one thing, it is an empirical ques-
tion just how large the potential loss in efficiency may be for any particular
fishery. Second, the inefficiencies are, for the most part, the result of rules de-
signed to protect the processing sector during the adjustment to a rights-based
regime. This is something that ITQ programs that grant all rights to harvesters
cannot always accomplish. In some cases, this protection may be necessary in
order to clear the political hurdles to implement a rights-based regime that can
provide some efficiency gains.
More work studying the full ramifications of the use of coops appears justi-
fied. This includes positive studies of how their operation will likely change
under different operating rules and normative studies to design new rules that
will lead to improvements in fisheries utilization with cooperatives.
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